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This paper aims to study the existing link between CEOs
turnover and several variables that could explain the exit of a CEO.
The survey takes performance measures into account as main
variables. Besides performance variables the study includes:
ownership structure variables; variables that highlight personal
features of a CEO and the composition of the board; firm variables.
The number of sampled Italian companies ranges from 134 to 218
over the period 1996-2002. Accounting returns explain the turnover
much better than market measures of performance; CEOs of state-
owned firms change more frequently than others; the stake of
minority shareholders is positively related to the turnover; the
presence of syndicates negatively affects the turnover. In Italy,
accounting returns “count” much more than market-based
performances. [JEL Classifications: G32; G34; J63; L14]
1. - Introduction
CEOs (chief executive officer) normally tend to change
according to a natural evolving process of a company regardless
of the performances obtained. Yet in some instances changing the
CEO is a common solution in response to bad performances. For
their nature this sort of turnovers are called “disciplinary”. A board
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monitoring on management should facilitate such changes.
Recently disciplinary changes showed a significant impact on
media because of the popularity of the companies involved (e.g.
Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, Cirio, Parmalat, etc.) and financial
scandals that often run along with the change.
Corporate governance rules help to increase effectiveness and
efficiency of decision-making process insuring a lean and balanced
distribution of the powers. On the other hand such rules improve
the quality of the control activities performed by both internal (i.e.
board of directors and board of auditors) and external bodies (i.e.
auditing companies and the authority in charge of control).
The general purpose of the researches on this subject is to
identify and test several determinants of the CEO turnover. The
major analysis pertains verifying whether or not poor accounting-
based and market-based performances of a company account for
the decision of a CEO to step down. The general purpose of the
present paper is to verify if the action of the board of directors is
driven by efficiency and welfare of the shareholders.
This paper, that belongs to the branch of studies that analyses
efficiency of the board of directors, enriches the debate with the
following issues:
a) It shapes and tests most common variables and hypotheses,
formulated by international literature, in the Italian context. It
also provides an interpretation of the findings in an Italian
business perspective with respect to ownership structure, stock
market and governance. It must be noticed that Italian firms have
not been investigated as much as U.S. firms by studies of the
above branch of studies;
b) unlike Italian studies quoted (Barontini, Caprio, 2002;
Brunello et al., 2003): it covers a more recent interval of years; it
adopts more original explanatory variables; it shows partially
different results and hypotheses.
We can assess whether the management that should look after
shareholders’ welfare, on the ground of bad shares performances,
stays on office or new managers become appointed. Besides shares
market value, a shareholder cares about profits generated, that
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Managers should therefore be assessed and judged in function of
both shares value and accounting-based performances.
If the assumptions are confirmed by empirical data we will
find a negative relation between turnover and performance. The
present study relies on three indicators of accounting-based
performances: ROI (return on investment, unadjusted measure-
ment), ROE (industry-adjusted return on equity) and a dummy
variable that becomes 1 or 0 respectively as the firm generates
losses or profits; two market measures of performance: the annual
stock returns (market-adjusted) and the industry-adjusted market
to book value of equity.
CEO turnover might be influenced by some extra variables,
called accessory variables, that don’t have a direct relationship to
the firm performance. Yet these variables might both support the
explanatory power of performance variables and explain why a
CEO steps down.
The following are the accessory variables:
1) variables that mirror the ownership structure (points 6, 7,
8, 9, paragraph 5);
2) variables that mirror personal features of the CEO and
composition of the board (points 10, 11, paragraph 5);
3) variables reflecting the type of firm (point 12, paragraph
5).
A brief explanation of the hypotheses underlying the accessory
variables follows:
With respect to the percentage of common shares held by
largest shareholder, two hypotheses may be tested: whereas on the
one hand the presence of a controlling shareholder would facilitate
the turnover due to the right of the shareholders’ meeting to fire
an incapable CEO, on the other hand in presence of a controlling
shareholder there could be economic, personal and family ties
with the CEO or being the CEO himself that hamper the turnover.
With reference to the stake of minority shareholders, a well
coordinated and joint action of outside blockholders (for the
definition of outside blockholders see point 7, paragraph 5) may
have some sort of impact on CEO facilitating the turnover. If this
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turnover and the weight of outside blockholders.
The existence of shareholder pacts among the main
shareholders, whose purpose is to stabilize the ownership
structure (block syndicate) or the exercise of the right to vote in
the shareholders’ meeting (voting syndicate), might negatively
affect the top executive turnover rate.
It is harder making hypotheses that account for a higher or
lower turnover for publicly-owned companies (state-owned firms
and municipal concerns). In this case, the CEO has no personal
or family relationships with the largest shareholder. This might
promote the top executive turnover. Given the relationship
between the top management and the central and local
governments (the Minister of Economy or the chiefs of the local
governments appoint the majority of directors and then the CEO),
the turnover, in these companies, could be pegged to the changes
in the central (i.e. Ministry of Economy) and local governments
(i.e. city council, provinces etc.).
Turnover rate may also increase with respect to the average
age of the CEOs, due to the possibility of illness, death or
retirement. However, the third explanation doesn’t hold if the
largest shareholder is CEO of the company. In this case, company
policy may lack a fixed age for retirement, as the long-term
leadership of one person maintains the image of stability towards
the investors and serves the economic interests of the CEO himself.
Just as the variable reflecting the presence of outside
blockholders, so should be the variable that pertains to the weight
of independent members within the board. Independent directors
with active attitudes consisting in neutral recommendations,
opinions and evaluations, can comprise a factor of discipline for
the CEO.
The following paragraphs deal with the following issues: 2nd,
the role and functions of the board of directors and management;
3rd, the causes and solutions of agency costs; 4th, the empirical
data collected; 5th, the description of the sample and variables
adopted; 6th, an illustration of results attained; 7th, conclusions
and further surveys linked to the present paper.
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Management
Corporate Governance is a system of written regulations, best
practices well regarded by the market, principles and procedures
which aim at shareholders’ protection
1. Corporate governance
aims at securing the best possible distribution of tasks, rights and
responsibilities among internal bodies (i.e. board of directors,
board of auditors and shareholders’ meeting) and external bodies
(i.e. supervisory authorities, auditing companies, firms charged
with the task of organizing and running regulated markets etc.).
Doing so corporate governance benefits both shareholders, by
maximizing the firm’s value, and stakeholders. Given the recent
financial scandals, those companies with a careful corporate
governance tend to be better regarded by investors. This is even
truer in case of finances incoming from institutional investors.
This good standing is unquestionably strengthened once the
company decides to raise funds in the market, even more in
adverse market conditions. However an excessive regulation might
hinder the management, slowing down the decision-making
process.
Governance systems of the so called “managerial firms” are
comprised of two bodies, closely linked by functions, roles and
competences: the board of directors and the management itself.
The board of directors is a collegial body that, by law (art.
2380-bis of the Civil Code), wields the power of firm’s
management. In reality, only few members of the board take part
in the operating management of the company: those directors that
are either delegated all or some powers by the board (apart from
those the law says are in charge of the board) or that have an
executive role within the company (e.g. general manager, chief
financial officer etc.). Both the types of directors are called
executive directors. These directors resemble in some respects U.S.
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1 SHLEIFER A. - VISHNY R. (1997) provide an effective and concise notion of
corporate governance: «Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment».inside directors. However it must be said that inside directors’
roles and origins are different to the Italian executive directors.
The former type is typically a member of the top management
that has spent much of his career within the company itself and
reached the top of managerial hierarchy, then becomes appointed
by the CEO to join the board. Mace (1986) and Lorsch-MacIver
(1989) argue that in the U.S. companies the board is dominated
by the CEO who appoints managers to join the board. On account
of such way of appointing, the boards of U.S. corporations are
mainly made up of insiders rather than outsiders
2. This accounts
for the reluctance of American literature that deals with efficiency
of the board to consider the board as means to reduce agency
costs. In the last years this characteristic seems to have changed:
the weight of outsiders has increased but there is no evidence
about the improvement of firms’ performance. On the contrary,
Bhagat, Black (1999) find opposite results: better performance in
the firms with few outsiders. Although Italian CEOs are members
of the management they don’t represent it overall as the largest
shareholder proposes their candidacy. These directors are very
much linked to the main shareholder and look after his interests
in the board. It’s not unusual that a CEO is appointed with few
or no years of experience as manager within the firm itself.
Parrino (1997) found that the case above occurred only in 2.66%
of sampled U.S. companies.
Directors that are not part of the managerial team and haven’t
got delegated powers by the board are called non-executive
directors. Non-executive directors usually outnumber executive. In
2002 the average number of non-executive directors in companies
listed on MTA (Italian regulated securities market) was 6.8, while
executive directors added up to 3.5 (Consob, 2002). Effective non-
executive directors are constantly kept up with the activities of
the executive directors, especially the CEO. What said holds
theoretically yet not operationally. Non-executive directors are
often linked to largest shareholder by economic, family and
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2 Professionals that have never held an executive position in the company
where they become appointed.intimate ties
3. This sort of relationships weakens the role of non-
executive directors. The problem can be tackled through non-
executive directors independent from the largest shareholder and
executive directors. Given the high ownership concentration
within Italian firms and that the largest shareholder proposes the
candidacy, the solution presented above seems unconvincing. It
must be said that the candidacy alone doesn’t imply a lack of
independence of the directors. The independence must be seen in
light of the existing relationships with the largest shareholder,
executive directors, the firm and the subsidiary-affiliated firms.
The “vote by list” method, widely adopted by publicly-owned
companies, is an alternative to secure a presence of independent
directors. By December 2002, 35 out of 218
4 sampled firms listed
on MTA had the “vote by list” system in their statutory books. The
“vote by list” might create some problems if a minimum number
of held shares is required to present the lists. If no minority
shareholder holds a significant stake, a coordination among small
shareholders to reach the minimum required is needed. However,
this solution generates costs for those that coordinate the action
of the shareholders that in turn only reap advantages. The free
riding issues hinder the coordination among shareholders.
Minority shareholders’ rights face alike problems (Bianchi et al.,
2002).
The management is the second player in a system of corporate
governance. This is the set of offices existing in a company from
the top to the bottom of the managerial hierarchy. Each role has
its own independence in making decision within respective areas
that differ in size according to the manager’s rank. At the top of
management we find the CEOs. From the foregoing we can say
that the management rather than the board looks after the actual
day by day running of the firm.
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relationship other than employer-employee with the company itself, the largest
shareholder, the controlled firms and the executive directors.
4 Data from statutory books of the firms and annual reports on corporate
governance.3. - Agency Costs: Causes and Tools to Reduce their Relevance
The general theory of agency (Jensen, Meckling, 1976)
analyses the relationship between shareholder (principal) and
manager (agent) as well as the related issues that might arise in
case of a diluted ownership.
In a firm marked by a diluted ownership the situation is as
follows: managers run the firm holding a small or nil amount of
shares. Thus a separation between control and ownership occurs
as the latter is spread among many holders that don’t interfere in
the firm’s running and whose main power is the right to vote. On
the ground of that, managers might have other aims than creating
value for shareholders that bear the agency costs: 1) managers
don’t invest in order to maximize shares’ value; 2) shareholders
need to monitor managers’ choices and pay for the related costs.
Jensen (1986) points to free cash flow (hereafter, FCF) as a
further cause of agency costs: managers of firms that show a high
FCF might spend the extra-cash in unprofitable investments. Small
growth opportunities can also be cause of agency costs related to
an excess of FCF: firms that show few investment opportunities are
exposed more to managers waste funds in projects with negative
net present value. Moreover as the growth opportunities are small
the FCF might be significant. Therefore, a high FCF and few
investment opportunities are independent causes of agency costs as
well as interrelated variables that might trigger one another.
Solutions to agency costs can be found in the following: 1)
grant of managerial stock incentives that aim to curb consequences
of separation between ownership and control; 2) the distribution of
cash (i.e. dividends and share repurchases) to shareholders and
creditors (i.e. debt is an alternative method of disgorging FCF) is a
tool that aims to take cash off managers’ possession
5 (Jensen, 1986;
Berger et al., 1997); 3) the board of directors that should monitor
managers’ activities.
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5 For an additional understanding on managerial stock incentives and payout
policy see: LAMBERT R.A. et AL. (1989); MORCK R. et AL. (1988); DENIS D.J. et AL. (1997a);
SMITH JR.C.W. - WATTS R.L. (1992); GAVER J.J. - GAVER K.M. (1993); BAGWELL L. - SHOVEN
J. (1988); DITTMAR A.K. (2000); FENN G.W. - LIANG N. (2001); ROZEFF M.S. (1982).Some American authors point out the contradictions in
managerial ownership: Morck et al. (1988) argue that managerial
ownership can make the replacement of a poorly-performing CEO
more difficult, on the ground of some attributes that express the
power of top executive such as: stature within the firm, status as
the firm’s founder, greater inside board representation, the
employment of fewer professional managers, the right to vote and
other non-quantifiable measures of power; Mikkelson, Partch
(1989 and 1997); Shivdasani (1993); Cotter, Zenner (1994); Denis,
Denis (1995); Denis et al. (1997a) highlight that greater levels of
managerial ownership may inhibit the external corporate control
market and, in so doing, reduce the effectiveness of internal
monitoring effort.
Agency costs also exist in presence of a concentrated
ownership (the Italian case) on account of two factors: private
benefits for controlling shareholders
6 and the control-enhancing
devices
7. Controlling shareholder can abuse of this power skewing
the advantages against minority shareholders that end up not
benefiting from the flow itself, therefore the largest shareholder
carries out an appropriation of value to the detriment of minority
shareholders. The devices above enable us to minimize the
“integrated ownership”
8 (Brioschi et al., 1990; Barca et al., 1994).
The degree of separation between ownership and control must be
measured according to “integrated ownership”. For instance, the
Pesenti family controlled Italcementi spa (operational firm)
through Efiparind BV (holding) and Italmobiliare spa (sub-
holding) by December 2003. The indirect and integrated stake
added up respectively to 26.81% and 10.06%
9.
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6 Private benefits are cash and goods’ flows generated by a firm that only
benefit the controlling shareholder or firms under his control rather than
contribute to the performances of the firm.
7 These devices enable the owner to control a great deal of voting shares, along
with the respective economic activities, through small financial means. The main
control-enhancing devices are: non-voting shares; pyramidal groups; links of stakes
within one or more groups.
8 The amount of cash flows that an external shareholder, in a group of firms,
would receive. In other words it is measured by the sum of the direct and indirect
ownership.
9 Data from annual statements and reports on operations.In presence of both concentrated and diluted ownership the
source of agency costs stays the same. However the aim is
achieved not through splitting the ownership but through control-
enhancing devices. In this case a conflict of interests involves
controlling and minority shareholders.
4. - International Empirical Evidence
All the studies (Table 1), consistently with the assumption that
the board of directors is efficient with respect to the measures of
performance, find a significant negative correlation between top
executive turnover and various measures of performance
(accounting-based and market-based measures of performance).
The studies that analyse the performance shown by the company
one or more years prior to (BC, PA, KS, K) and the same year of
the substitution (BC, PI, K) find the strongest correlation between
stock returns with a lag of one year and turnover. Yet this conclusion
can’t be generalized: PI’s study shows that stock returns measured
on the very same year of the substitution have a stronger
explanatory power than those of the year before. By contrast stock
returns considered in BC on the same year of the turnover never
show a significant statistical correlation to this event. However, in
BC the best results date three years prior the substitution. BC argue
that stock returns anticipate accounting-based performances.
Conversely K argues that both the avenues of returns are capable
to explain CEO turnover. Yet K measures the turnover over 2-year
periods and the returns over the contemporaneous and previous 2-
year intervals. Only MP’s study finds a non-significant negative
correlation to stock returns. In KS the link between stock returns
and turnover is negative and statistically significant if we focus on
non-routine turnovers
10.
The relation between turnover and accounting measures of
performance, regardless of the variable adopted, is both significant
and negative. Only in BC, the annual change in total turnover does
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10 The president loses his position and does not remain on the board.not account for the change of executive directors. PA’s study, that
includes the origin of the incoming CEO, finds that as the firm
underperforms industry performance, the likelihood that an
outside candidate is appointed increases steady. Even if the new
CEO is an inside candidate and the replacement is forced the
coefficient is negative but smaller than in the case of an outsider
CEO. MP consider whether the market for corporate control is
“active” or “passive”. A “passive” market for corporate control
produces a smaller sensitivity of turnover to performances
(accounting-based and market-based), according to the expectations.
BC’s study shows a higher turnover rate and a higher sensitivity of
the turnover to accounting returns as the company deals in financial
services.
With reference to the assessment of the turnover’s probability,
the studies that estimate the implied changes in probability of
turnover using performance variables measured through “position
indicators” (e.g. interquartile range, difference between the 90th
and 10th percentile, etc.) show little variations of turnover’s
probability: DDS find a decrease in probability of turnover in
correspondence of an improvement of performance of 1.5% (using
stock returns); 3.9% for KS and 3% respectively using stock
returns and ROA; 1.22% for BC using a stock return with a three-
year lag to the turnover and 1.74% using the current ROE; 6% for
MP using ROA but only in the period with an “active” market for
corporate control. This result confirms the crucial role of the
market for corporate control. BGP’s study shows a reduction in
turnover’s probability as big as 10.6%, the most significant one,
in correspondence of an increase of stock returns as big as the
difference between the 75th and 25th percentile. Assuming that
the CEO is not the controlling shareholder (i.e. the dummy
variable called “CEO ownership” equals 0), then the figure adds
up to 22.2%. Conversely the implied change in probability of
turnover is nil if the dummy variable equals 1.
K analyses the implied change in probability of turnover,
adopting the standard deviation as “dispersion measure”: a two-
standard-deviation decline in stock returns is associated with an
increase in the likelihood of CEO turnover of 17.4%. The presence
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empirical studies  year sample, interval of years 
(reference) and statistical method
Barontini, Caprio (BC) 2002 All the firms listed on the Milan Stock
Exchange, examined from 1976 to 1996.
Maximum number: 244 (1992); min-
imum number: 124 (1977). Statistical
method: OLS and LOGIT.
Brunello et al. (BGP) 2003 60 firms listed on the Italian Stock Ex-
changes, selected excluding: banks,
insurance companies, financial holdings
companies, state-owned firms and firms
listed for only part of the period (1987 -
1997). Statistical method: PROBIT.
Denis et al. (DDS) 1997b 1394 U.S. firms covered by the VLIS
(Value Line Investment Survey) as of
year-end 1984, over the period 1985 -
1988. Statistical method: LOGIT.
Kang,  Shivdasani  (KS) 1995 270 non-financial Japanese firms cov-
ered in the 1984 volume of Moody’s In-
ternational Report, examined from 1985
to 1990. Statistical method: LOGIT.
Kaplan (K) 1994 1st sample: 119 Japanese firms included
in Fortune magazine’s list of the 500
largest foreign industrials in 1980. 2nd
sample: 146 U.S. firms with the highest
sales on Fortune’s list of the 500 largest
industrials in 1980. The samples were
examined from 1980 to 1988. Statistical
method: OLS and LOGIT.
Mikkelson, Partch (MP) 1997 240 industrial firms included in the CR-
SP (Centre for Research in Security
Prices) that were publicly traded at the
end of 1983 and 1988. The 1st sample
was examined from 1984 to 1988, the
2nd sample was examined from 1989 to
1993. Statistical method: LOGIT.
Parrino (PA) 1997 31 CEOs who were in office throughout
the 1970 - 1989 period. The data about
CEOs were collected in the 1989 Forbes
compensation survey. Statistical method:
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT.
Pigé  (PI) 1996 222 non-financial firms listed on the
Paris Stock Exchange over the period
1985 - 1989. They were selected in the
universe of the listed firms in 1971 that
were still listed in 1990. Statistical
method: OLS and LOGISTIC.of outliers, influencing arithmetic mean and standard deviation,
can also account for such increase. Therefore a two-standard-
deviation change in performances might turn out far bigger value
than if obtained through “position indicators”. BC also use the
same method as K and obtain higher variations: the stock return
with a three-year lag to the turnover shows an increase in the
likelihood of turnover as big as 3.38%, while the current ROE adds
up to 4.07%.
With respect to the ownership structure variables, DDS and
MP find a statistically significant negative relation between CEO
turnover and the stake of directors and officers. These results
suggest a confirmation of Morck’s et al. (1988) hypotheses on the
managerial entrenchment.
BC and PI show a positive and significant relation between
turnover and the percentage of common shares held by the largest
shareholder. This result would confirm the theory exposed in the
first paragraph (i.e. a strong controlling shareholder can make the
turnover easy). BGP don’t find any evidence with respect to this
variable. BGP find no evidence that supports theoretical hypothesis
concerning the monitoring role of outside blockholders
11. On the
contrary, the presence of a second large shareholder would
hinder CEO turnover. The following two explanations account
for such phenomenon: 1) being the sample made up of Italian
companies that notoriously have a concentrated ownership,
second shareholder has little monitoring power; 2) second
shareholder might be bound to the largest shareholder through
formal pacts, intimate and family relationships and links of
stakes. DDS, in regard to the variable that highlights the
presence of outside blockholders, find a regression coefficient
that is both significant and positive. Conversely, DDS find no
proof that the presence of institutional investors promotes the
turnover of poorly-performing CEOs.
None of the three studies (i.e. DDS, MP, KS) that assess the
weight of independent directors show a statistically significant
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11 In BGP the proxy of outside blockholders is the size of the stake held by
the second largest shareholder.evidence that backs up the hypothesis above (see paragraph 1).
With respect to the age of CEOs all the studies, except BGP’s study,
show a significant and positive coefficient. The features of the
firms sampled by BGP may account for the non-significant
correlation between age and CEO turnover. In these firms when
the owner coincides with the CEO the retirement age could be
inexistent. PA shows a strong positive link between turnover and
age as the CEO is an inside candidate and/or the turnover is
voluntary. The link weakens if the new CEO is appointed from
outside the firm (i.e. another firm within the industry or another
industry). The regression coefficient even changes sign if the
turnover is forced. It might be that a substitution with an inside
candidate occurs more often on account of the natural changes
that occur at the top of U.S. firms. On the other hand, bad
performances account for the so called “forced” substitutions
regardless of the outgoing CEO’s age.
With respect to the variable that expresses the number of
years that the CEO spent on office, the results don’t confirm any
hypothesis: BC, DDS and KS, consistently with the hypothesis that
an increase of the years spent by the CEO within the firm reflects
a smaller turnover likely on account of the intimate and reputable
links to shareholders, obtain negative regression coefficients.
Nevertheless, these coefficients are never significant; BGP’s study
always shows positive and significant coefficients
12.
As the CEO is the firm’s founder or a member of the founding
family, according to DDS and PA’s findings, the likelihood of CEO
turnover decreases steady.
With respect to the firm’s size, the studies don’t point to a one
way conclusion: BC, MP and BGP find no evidence. By contrast,
DDS show a negative and significant relation between size and
CEO turnover. It might be argued that the result is due to the
higher efficiency of the board in small firms, whose boards are
generally smaller, that determines a more frequent turnover.
Conversely, PA’s results contradict DDS and confirm the researches
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12 The result is explained as follows: rather than be sacked in the midst of his
office, whose legal tenure is three years, it’s easier not to renew a CEO when the
mandate is expired.of Jensen and Murphy (1990), whose hypothesis is that the CEOs
of U.S. large companies tend to hold a small stake in the firm,
and of Parrino (1990) that finds a positive correlation between the
size and the percentage of outside directors in the board
13.
5. - Sample, Variables and Empirical Method
The starting sample is made up of 237 firms listed on the
Italian Regulated Stock Exchange (MTA) by December 31st 2002.
From this universe I have excluded: foreign companies on account
of the insufficient information available; companies listed for less
than one year, on account of the brief span of time and related
information; companies no longer listed by December 31st 2002
on account of the insufficient information available. The survey
covers the 7-year period 1996 - 2002. After this selection my open
pooled sample consists of 1,211 firm-years involving a different
number of firms each year (Table 2).
The dependent variable (TURNOi,t), expressed as the turnover
of either the CEOs and/or chairmen of the boards (if a firm has
no CEO or the chairman wields executive powers), is a
dichotomous variable that equals 1 in correspondence of a
turnover, and 0 otherwise
14. A turnover occurs when: a) one or
more CEOs leave the board; b) one or more CEOs lose the
executive position but not necessarily the directorship.
Substitutions within a year since a non-ordinary event, such as a
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logarithm of total assets and the natural logarithm of sales.
14 The replacement of CEOs has been observed by December 31st of each year.
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF COMPANIES ENCOMPASSED IN THE SAMPLE
Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
number of companies 134 143 152 166 191 207 218change of control, have been taken off from the sample.
Information concerning turnover comes from Consob (the Italian
supervisory authority for markets and securities) and Calepino
dell’Azionista.
The following is a description of the independent variables:
1) RET0, RET1, RET2, RET3: annual stock returns as the sum
of the percentage capital gain and of the dividend yield
respectively in the same year of and in the year prior to the
turnover, with a lag of two and three years
15. Returns have been
measured through continuous capitalization and adjusted by
subtracting a market index from the raw measurement. Market
index results from the average of stock returns, in a given year,
registered for all the firms of the sample.
2) MB0, MB1, MB2: annual industry-adjusted market to
book value of equity registered, respectively, in the same year of
the turnover and with a lag of one and two years. The adjusted
measure has been computed by dividing the raw measurement
by the median value of market to book value of the firms
belonging to the same industry as the firm considered. The
classification in sectors has been done according to Mediobanca
industry codes.
3) ROE0, ROE1, ROE2, ROE3
16: annual equity capital
profitability measured, respectively, in the same year of and in the
year prior to the turnover, with a lag of two and three years. The
ratios are computed as follows: net profit of year n scaled by the
mean of equity capital computed in the year n and  n – 1. The
adjusted measures have been computed by subtracting, from the
raw measurements, the median performance measure of all firms
belonging to the same industry as the firm considered.
4) ROI0, ROI1, ROI2, ROI3: return on investment measured
by EBIT
17 (earnings before interest and taxes) scaled by net
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15 The prices and the market capitalization have been surveyed in the last
securities trading day of each year.
16  Accounting-based performances (ROE, ROI and LOS) refer to annual
statements closed by December 31st of each year and adopted by April 30th of
following year.
17  EBIT = revenues from sales ± change in inventories (finished goods,
semifinished products, raw materials) – cost of raw materials and services + otheroperating invested capital (NOIC
18). ROI has been calculated for
only industrial, commercial and services firms excluding financial
firms (banks, insurance companies, financial holding companies,
leasing companies and other financial brokers) for accounting
reasons
19. In the regressions, these variables have been considered
as missing values by financial firms. For the aforesaid reason the
number of observations is smaller
20.
5) LOS0, LOS1, LOS2, LOS3: dummy variable that equals 1
in presence of losses, otherwise it becomes 0.
6) 1°SH: percentage of common shares held by the largest
shareholder.
7) BLOCK: percentage of common shares held by outside
blockholders. They are defined as those holders of at least 2% of
the firm’s common shares that are neither related to management
nor the largest shareholder through family relationships and/or
voting syndicates
21.
8) SYND: dummy variable that takes value 1 in presence of
a block syndicate and/or a voting syndicate among the main
shareholders, and 0 otherwise. I have also taken the existing
pacts among the shareholders of the controlling company into
account.
9) PUB: dummy variable that becomes 1 if a public institution
(i.e. city council, Ministry of Economy etc.) is the largest
shareholder, otherwise becomes 0
22.
10) AGE: the variable takes, as value, the age or the average
age of the CEO should they be more than one on office. Should
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operating income and revenues – personnel costs – amortization of tangible and
intangible fixed assets + additions to internally produced fixed assets – other
operating costs.
18  NOIC = trade receivables + inventories (finished goods, semifinished
products, raw materials) + other non-financial current assets + tangible and
intangible fixed assets – trade payables – other non-financial current liabilities –
reserve for employee severance indemnities.
19 For ROI variables the adjustment in order to consider the industry effect
has produced bad results on account of the small size of the sample that makes
the setting of the sectors very difficult and non-significant.
20 For these variables the firms included in the sample are: 61 (1996); 68 (1997);
74 (1998); 86 (1999); 103 (2000); 115 (2001); 124 (2002).
21 The largest shareholder is never included in the calculation of the variable.
22 I take the “ultimate owner” into account and not the direct owner.it be there a turnover, the variable becomes a value which is the
age of the outgoing CEO or the mean with more than one CEO.
11) IND: dummy variable that equals 1 as the number of
independent directors in the board outnumbers a given figure
23,
otherwise 0.
12) FIN: dummy variable that becomes 1 as the firm deals in
the financial services
24.
Accounting data are extracted from the annual statements
provided by the chambers of commerce and R&D database of
Mediobanca; market data are provided by the Borsa Italiana spa
(Italian Stock Exchange) and Calepino dell’Azionista; ownership
structure’s data (since 1998) and the data concerning CEO’s age
are collected from the Consob web site and AIDA database. For
the years 1996 and 1997 these data are provided by researches
and studies department of Consob; data on the independency of
directors are extracted from annual reports on corporate
governance, Il Sole 24 Ore online and research engines. The link
existing between CEO turnover and the explanatory variables is
assessed through logistic regressions
25.
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23 For a board of directors up to 8 members: 2 independent directors or more;
for a board between 9 and 14 members: 3 independent directors or more; for a
board greater than 14 members: 4 independent directors or more.
Data extracted from Instructions for the regulation of regulated markets under
the control of Borsa Italiana spa in the chapter that regulates the number of
independent directors for companies that belong to the STAR section.
24 Insurance companies and credit brokers (banks, leasing companies, etc.)
have been included within the category of financial services companies.
25 The logistic model enables us to directly estimate the likelihood of an
event occurring. The model fits the dependent variables that can have only two
values and then the assumptions necessary for hypotheses testing in regression
analysis are necessarily violated. For example, it is unreasonable to assume
that the distribution of errors is normal. The logistic model can be written as
follows:
where: B0, B1, B2, Bn, are coefficients estimated from the data; X1, X2, Xn are the
independent variables.
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01 12 2 16. - Results
The average age of Italian, French and American CEOs differs
little. For the USA: K finds an age of 58.30; MP 57 and 56 years,
respectively, at the start and end of the period during an active
market for corporate control. For the France, PI finds an age of
57.40. The age results lower than that of Japanese presidents, as
K and KS show an average age, respectively, of 65.10 and 61.84.
Turnover rate is also alike to U.S. firms: K finds a rate of 12.14%
including takeovers and 10.35% excluding changes due to death
or illness; DDS find the highest rate of 11.20%, with managers
holding up to 1% of the ownership, and lowest rate of 3.40% if
the managerial ownership is between 40% and 50%, excluding
changes due to death, illness and retirement. However, the
turnover rate is lower than in Japanese firms: KS find a rate of
13.46%; K a rate of 15.03% including takeovers and 14.86%
excluding changes due to death or illness.
Table 4 and 5 show, consistently with expectations, a negative
and significant correlation between accounting measures of
performance (i.e. adjusted ROE and unadjusted ROI) and CEOs
turnover, at the 1% and 5% level. The variables ROE and ROI
result significant up to three years prior to the change. This means
that the turnover often coincides with the legal end of the office
(i.e. three years) rather than as immediate consequence of  bad
performances. The variable LOS0, that points out the loss
produced in the same year as the substitution, has a noticeably
significant correlation (i.e. at the 1% level) to the turnover. This
highlights that a loss, in a given fiscal year, represents a strong
incentive to the CEO to resign from the office. The variables LOS1
and LOS2 show to be significant only on multivariate regressions
at the 5% level. Unlike accounting measures of performance,
market-based measures of performance (i.e. RET and MB) show
little (RET1) or no link to turnover (RET2, RET3 and all the
variables of MB), apart from the variable RET0. The latter scores
a significant negative relation at the 1% level in multivariate
regressions and at the 5% level in simple regressions. I point out
that the results are less robust without the adjustment of the ROE
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coefficients as well as the implied changes in probability of
turnover are smaller and the statistical robustness is worse. This
result matters as highlights the right appraisal of accounting
measures of performance that are weighed with reference to
industry performance, on account of the business risk.
The features of Italian market and firms, that are often
managed by the largest shareholder or a member of the controlling
family, may account for the remarkable difference between
market-based and accounting-based measures of performance. If
this is the case the shares’ value fails to reflect the true value of
the firm, from the point of view of controlling shareholder,
because of number of causes among which the private benefits.
Thus market-based performance is little taken into account for a
prospective change at the top. A further explanation is a little
reliance on the growth of value reported by Italian firms, both for
the high concentration of ownership, that weakens the role of the
market as referee by reducing the probability of a takeover threat,
and for the traditional perspective of Italian entrepreneurs more
oriented to accounting than to the financial markets.
A remarkable increase in implied change in probability of
turnover stands out, simulating a two-standard-deviation decline
in ROI from its mean
26. This highlights the high intensity of the
link between turnover and performance of operating business
27.
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
124
26 I tried to insert in the same regression two measures of performance, one
is accounting-based and the other is market-based, in order to check if this could
improve the explanatory power of the model and the statistical robustness of the
coefficients: the results were bad. The two variables often show a high correlation
producing a loss of significance of one of them (usually the market-based
performance).
As further explanation of both bad results found with reference to variables
RET1, RET2 and RET3 and good results found for all accounting-based
performances (ROE and ROI) there could be a serial correlation of accounting
returns: current ROE may be associated to turnover as well as lagged variables. I
tried to test this hypothesis by inserting all measures of performance (ROE, ROI
and RET) in the same regression: RET0 confirms its significance but at the 10%
level; ROE and ROI variables reduce their explanatory power except ROE0, ROE2
and ROI2. This finding confirms some serial correlation of accounting returns.
The matrix of the correlations between the variables confirms what I said above.
27 The estimate of the implied change in probability of turnover associated
with a two-standard-deviation decrease in the performance has also beenIn spite of the non-significant results for FIN variable (CEOs of
both financial and non-financial firms show a similar turnover),
I have studied the link between FIN and ROE in depth according
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conducted in the multivariate regressive model (Table 5), assuming that all other
independent variables remain constant at their respective means, with the
following results: ROE0 = 6.82%; ROE1 = 6.94%; ROE2 = 11.66%; ROE3 = 5.84%;
ROI0 = 12.86%; ROI1 = 12.12%; ROI2 = 17%; ROI3 = 10.30%; LOS0 = 9.62%;
LOS1 = 6.81%; LOS2 = 6.86%; RET0 = 6.60%; RET1 = 4.28%.
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variables Mean Median Std. deviat.
ROE0 (unadjusted measure %) 6.9639 6.3297 16.0024
ROE1 (unadjusted measure %) 7.3638 6.4764 12.2330
ROE2 (unadjusted measure %) 6.9681 6.0880 12.0624
ROE3 (unadjusted measure %) 6.4465 5.7280 13.5159
ROI0 (%) 16.0553 11.9635 22.0054
ROI1 (%) 16.4175 12.1714 21.8612
ROI2 (%) 17.0354 12.3585 22.7327
ROI3 (%) 15.3453 12.3574 18.2574
RET0 (unadjusted measure %) 2.6679 1.7858 41.3445
RET0 (adjusted measure %) 0 –1.9358 34.5449
RET1 (unadjusted measure %) 3.8495 1.7632 41.2898
RET1 (adjusted measure %) 0 –2.2926 30.7222
RET2 (unadjusted measure %) 13.1699 10.4716 37.7824
RET2 (adjusted measure %) 0 –3.1125 33.4041
RET3 (unadjusted measure %) 13.6262 12.0313 39.0819
RET3 (adjusted measure %) 0 –2.5136 33.7967
MB0 (unadjusted measure) 2.6536 1.5239 4.5355
MB1 (unadjusted measure) 2.6438 1.5212 4.5626
MB2 (unadjusted measure) 2.6318 1.5663 4.3644
AGE (years) 57.8144 58 8.5027
1°SH (%) 45.3138 51 22.3994
BLOCK (%) 8.8684 4.7810 10.9928




TOP EXECUTIVE TENURE (years)
(with takeovers) 7.9418
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TABLE 4
RESULTS OF SIMPLE REGRESSIONS (*)
Var. B0 P-value B1 P-value Nr. obs. R
2(NK) ∆PROB
(B0)( B1)
ROE0 –1.9146 0.0000 –0.0162 0.0011 1,147 2.90% 6.75%
ROE1 –1.8099 0.0000 –0.0192 0.0095 1,135 2.50% 6.21%
ROE2 –1.7568 0.0000 –0.0326 0.0000 1,135 4.10% 11.50%
ROE3 –1.7414 0.0000 –0.0165 0.0116 1,125 2.30% 6.06%
ROI0 –1.6443 0.0000 –0.0267 0.0003 588 5.30% 17.77%
ROI1 –1.6521 0.0000 –0.0258 0.0007 584 5.00% 16.79%
ROI2 –1.5480 0.0000 –0.0311 0.0002 576 6.40% 22.86%
ROI3 –1.5644 0.0000 –0.0278 0.0004 554 5.60% 15.36%
LOS0 –1.9848 0.0000 0.6454 0.0024 1,162 2.60% 8.68%
LOS1 –1.8479 0.0000 0.4066 0.0762 1,160 1.80% 5.52%
LOS2 –1.8169 0.0000 0.4221 0.0676 1,152 1.90% 5.88%
LOS3 –1.7761 0.0000 0.2822 0.2202 1,140 1.60% 3.86%
RET0 –1.7594 0.0000 –0.0062 0.0164 1,134 2.10% 6.21%
RET1 –1.7913 0.0000 –0.0049 0.0923 1,021 2.10% 4.01%
RET2 –1.6983 0.0000 –0.0026 0.3537 943 2.20% 2.41%
RET3 –1.8668 0.0000 0.0014 0.6602 871 1.30% –1.06%
MB0 –1.7206 0.0000 –0.0635 0.2774 1,152 1.50% 3.52%
MB1 –1.6707 0.0000 –0.0779 0.2060 1,146 1.70% 4.35%
MB2 –1.6655 0.0000 –0.0597 0.3454 1,047 1.80% 2.97%
AGE –3.1982 0.0000 0.0244 0.0120 1,163 2.30% 5.88%
PUB –1.8659 0.0000 0.8547 0.0012 1,163 2.70% 13.27%
1°SH –1.9523 0.0000 0.0040 0.2814 1,157 1.50% 2.37%
BLOCK –1.9293 0.0000 0.0153 0.0276 1,160 2.00% 4.63%
SYND –1.7043 0.0000 –0.3496 0.0886 1,160 1.80% –4.02%
FIN –1.7698 0.0000 –0.0517 0.7901 1,163 1.30% –0.63%
IND –1.8404 0.0000 0.0918 0.5833 1,163 1.40% 1.12%
(*) VAR.: independent variable; B0: constant of the regressive model; B1:
regression coefficient; P-value: significance level for the Wald statistic, which has
a chi-square distribution, concerning coefficients B0 and B1; Nr. obs.: number of
data included in the model; R
2(NK): measure of goodness of fit of the model
(Nagelkerke R
2);  ∆PROB: implied change in probability of turnover assuming a
two-standard-deviation change from mean in the independent variable. For
dichotomous variables has been simulated a switch from 0 to 1 in its value. Each
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.to the considerable weight of financial firms in the sample (in
2002 they were 46) by creating two sub-samples. On both sub-
samples I have conducted separate regressions with regard to each
ROE variable. The results show that the implied change in
probability of turnover, assuming a two-standard-deviation decline
in ROE, is higher in the sub-sample of financial firms: 8.70% for
financial firms, 6.94% for non-financial firms using ROE0. In
order to strengthen the evidence that shows a higher sensitivity
of turnover to performance for financial firms, I have included in
the simple regressive model an interactive variable that is the
product of FIN and ROE (FIN*ROE). The findings (Table 6)
confirm what I said above: the negative and significant coefficient
of the interactive variable highlights a higher sensitivity of
turnover to accounting returns for financial firms
28.
With respect to the accessory variables, some conclusions can
be drawn: AGE is positively and significantly linked to the
turnover, but only in the overall sample. The regressions that
include ROI variables (i.e. regressions from 5 to 8 of Table 5), that
only consider non-financial firms, show that the age is not linked
to the turnover. The diversity of the results can be explained by
the fact that banks, insurance companies and other financial
brokers have experienced professionals that are generally elder
persons. Besides, holding companies, that are often controlled by
a family, can be led by elder shareholders and founders. If, like
in the present study, turnover involves more frequently these
subjects the tie between AGE and turnover will be strong
29:
turnover can occur on account of events as death, illness and
retirement.
BLOCK variable shows a positive and significant (at the 5%
and 10% level) relation to the turnover in the overall sample, in
spite of the high ownership concentration of Italian companies. A
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28 The variables ROE1, ROE2 and ROE3 produce qualitatively similar results
both in the estimate of turnover’s probability and in the regressions.
29 CEOs of financial companies average the age of 59.96, while CEOs of non-
financial companies score 56.87 on average (P-value: 0.0000). Using the median
rather than the mean, the difference is even bigger: 61 is the median age of
financial companies’ CEOs, 57 is the median age of non-financial companies’ CEOs.significant weight of outside blockholders contributes to increase
the turnover, according to the hypotheses made.
PUB variable shows that firms whose largest shareholder is a
public authority achieve a significantly higher turnover rate than
the other sampled firms. CEOs of a publicly-owned firm have a
13.27% higher probability to step down than in a privately-owned
firm. In order to overcome the difficulties in explaining this result
I have studied both the changes at the top of the Ministry of
Economy and the dates of the elections from 1996 to 2002: no
direct link stands out (over the period 1996-2002 there were 7
Ministers of Economy – 6 of the Centre-Left and 1 of the Centre-
Right – and 2 general elections: in April 1996 and in May 2001.
Turnover in the state-owned firms “reminds” the changes of the
Ministers of Economy but the link with them is quite accidental.
For example: in 1996 and 1997 the turnover involved only the
CEOs of Alitalia, Finmeccanica and Italgas; in 2001: Alitalia and
Saipem were involved but not Eni that controlled Saipem directly;
in 2002: Enel and Finmeccanica changed their CEOs; CEOs of Eni
and Autostrade changed in 1998. The foregoing reasoning also
means to municipal concerns).
SYND variable, in non-financial firms, shows that the
existence of syndicates among main shareholders stabilizes the
running of the company and reduces the turnover. Yet the negative
relation is weak (at the 10% level). Deleting the IND variable from
the model the significance of SYND rises to 5%: the two variables
are correlated. In detail, I find a negative relation between IND
and SYND which means a lower incidence of independent
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TABLE 6




(*) B0: constant of the regressive model; ROE0 and FIN*ROE0: independent
variables; the values reported in parentheses express the significance level for the
Wald statistic concerning each coefficient. The regression includes seven time
dummies.directors whenever the main shareholders are linked by a
syndicate, likely as most directors represent the interests of
shareholders that join the pact. The other variables (i.e. 1°SH
30,
FIN and IND) don’t provide a relevant evidence
31.
7. - Conclusions
The main findings can be highlighted in the following points:
— Accounting returns are the best determinants to explain
CEO turnover. A statistically significant negative correlation (i.e.
almost always at the 1% level) between the turnover and
accounting measures of performance, especially ROE and ROI, is
found. ROE and ROI are significant up to three years prior to the
change, confirming that poor accounting returns generally don’t
cause an immediate turnover. Often the CEO is left in office for
the 3-year term (i.e. the legal tenure). The turnover also shows a
higher sensitivity to the performance (ROE) for the sub-sampled
financial firms. Market-based performances show a notably
inferior explanatory power than accounting returns. The current
stock return is the only market-based performance that shows a
good statistical significance (i.e. at the 1% and 5% level).
— CEO’s age is positively related to the turnover. The older
the CEO, the higher the likelihood of turnover becomes. This
result is not consistent with the findings in non-financial firms
(see the footnote number 31 too).
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30 The use of discrete values for the 1°SH variable (0, if the largest shareholder
holds less than 20% of firm’s common shares; 1, if the largest shareholder holds
between 20% and 50% of common shares; 2, if the largest shareholder holds more
than 50% of common shares) confirms the positiveness of the regression
coefficients but does not improve the statistical significance.
31 In order to explain more clearly both the non-significance of the link between
the turnover and the variables AGE (only for non-financial firms) and 1°SH and
the change of sign of the coefficient for 1°SH in the overall sample (positive) and
in the sample of non-financial firms (negative), I tried to check if both the presence
of personal, family and economic ties between the CEO and the controlling
shareholder and the coincidence in the same person of both offices (CEO and
controlling shareholder) could hinder the turnover. Yet the difficulties in detecting
both the right identity of the controlling shareholder and the economic and
intimate ties with the CEO did not allow me to find reliable results. I point out
this analysis for a future widening of the study in presence of more complete and
reliable information.— PUB variable shows that turnover rate is remarkably higher
in publicly-owned firms than in privately-owned firms. Yet the
replacements are not concentrated in specific years but they are
distributed over the 7-year period quite evenly: there is no direct
link between turnover and elections or changes at the top of the
Ministry of Economy;
— BLOCK variable points to a positive and significant relation
to the turnover, despite a sometimes weak level of significance (i.e.
at the 10% level). This result points to an active attitude of outside
blockholders, in spite of the high ownership concentration of
Italian firms. The results do not hold for non-financial firms;
— 1°SH variable shows a positive correlation to the turnover
in the overall sample and a negative correlation in the sample of
non-financial firms. Yet it is never statistically significant and
therefore insufficient to draw reliable conclusions (see the footnote
number 31 too);
— SYND variable, in non-financial firms, shows a statistically
significant negative correlation to the turnover. The existence of a
syndicate among the main shareholders contributes to stabilize
the running of the company reducing the turnover.
An investigation into prospective links existing between firm
performance and the rewards of CEOs and executive directors
would be an interesting follow-up to this study. It would help to
unveil the role of compensation in the improvement of the firm
performance
32. An event study of how the market reacts to the
appointment or substitution of a CEO could be a further
interesting analysis.
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32 Only since 1999 listed firms have been requested to provide information
concerning compensation to directors and general managers (see the regulation
for issuers issued by Consob).BIBLIOGRAPHY
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